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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Marie Ann Fuges appeals from an order of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
entering summary judgment in favor of Southwest Financial 
Services, Ltd. (“Southwest”) with respect to Fuges‟s claim 
that Southwest willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting 
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Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x.  Fuges claims that 
Southwest willfully violated FCRA when it included 
inaccurate information in a report to Fuges‟s lender 
concerning potential encumbrances on her home.  Southwest 
argues in response that it is not a “consumer reporting 
agency” (“CRA”) governed by FCRA, and that the statute 
does not apply to the report that it provided to Fuges‟s lender.  
The District Court held that no reasonable jury could find that 
Southwest had willfully violated FCRA, because Southwest 
reasonably interpreted the statute as inapplicable to its 
activities and so, under the standard set forth in Safeco 
Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007), 
Southwest could not be liable as claimed.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
 
I. Background 
 
 A. Facts 
 
 Southwest sells current owner title reports, otherwise 
known as property search or limited property reports 
(“property reports” or “reports”) to consumer lenders.  The 
purpose of those reports is to confirm the identity of the 
current holder of title to the property and to determine 
whether the property is encumbered.  All of the information 
that Southwest collects is available in public records.       
 
 Southwest‟s reports include the name and address of 
the property owner, the marital status of the property owner 
(if it appears on the deed), the amounts of any outstanding 
mortgages, and the amounts of any outstanding liens or 
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judgments against the property.
1
  The property reports do not 
include the owner‟s social security number, payment history, 
previous addresses, employment information, date of birth, or 
outstanding account balances all of which would typically be 
included in a consumer credit report prepared by one of the 
“Big Three” credit reporting agencies (Equifax, Experian, and 
Trans Union).  Another point of distinction is that Southwest 
endeavors to include in its property reports only those 
judgment liens that remain unsatisfied at the time of the 
report, because only those liens encumber the property.  A 
typical credit report, by contrast, shows judgment liens that 
have been satisfied, because they are part of a consumer‟s 
payment history.   
 
Marie Ann Fuges had a $35,000 line of credit from 
PNC Bank (“PNC”), which she secured with the home she 
owned in Philadelphia.  In 2008, she applied to PNC for 
payment protection insurance that would repay her line of 
credit in the event that she died or became disabled.  PNC 
told Fuges that, in order to obtain the insurance, she needed to 
reapply for her line of credit.
2
  She did so, and, after she 
                                              
1
 Because the purpose of Southwest‟s property reports 
is to determine whether property to be used as collateral for a 
loan is encumbered, if a consumer seeks to secure a loan with 
collateral owned by a third party, the property report would 
only include information on that third party, not the 
consumer.  For approximately 80 percent of Southwest‟s 
Pennsylvania property reports, however, the loan applicant is 
also the owner of the subject property.  
2
 Fuges also applied for a $5000 increase in the line of 
credit, even though that increase was not required in order for 
her to obtain the credit insurance.   
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submitted her loan application, PNC ordered a credit report 
generated by a credit reporting agency, as well as a property 
report on the home that she owned.  Southwest prepared the 
latter and provided information concerning the ownership of 
the home that Fuges put up as collateral, as well as 
information on whether the property was subject to 
mortgages, judgment liens, unpaid taxes, or other 
encumbrances. 
 
 More specifically, that property report contained the 
following information:  (1) Fuges‟s name and address; (2) a 
note concerning her marital status; (3) the amount of her 
mortgage ($35,000.00); (4) a reference to a $111.11 property 
tax delinquency; and (5) a reference to a $2,923.63 judgment 
lien filed by a merchant for a delinquency on the part of her 
son, Robert W. Fuges.  The report was inaccurate in two 
respects.  First, Fuges‟s property tax payments were arguably 
not delinquent because she had an agreement with the City of 
Philadelphia to pay her taxes in monthly installments.  
Second, the property report should not have reflected the 
judgment lien because inclusion of the lien wrongly assumed 
that the debt was owed by Fuges‟s deceased husband, Robert 
E. Fuges, who had been an owner of the property at one time.   
 
 After PNC received the Fuges property report, it 
informed Fuges that it could not approve her loan application 
without proof that she had paid her property taxes.  Later, 
however, PNC provided Fuges with the credit insurance, 
leaving her existing line of credit in place.
3
   
                                              
3
 It is unclear from the record when PNC changed its 
mind about the credit insurance, or for what reason.  Fuges 
testified that she found out “by accident” (App. at 427) that 
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 B. Procedural History 
 
   On February 18, 2009, Fuges filed a putative class 
action against Southwest, alleging that Southwest failed to 
comply with FCRA in preparing the property report that it 
had provided to PNC in connection with her credit 
application.  She initially claimed damages for both willful 
and negligent violations of the statute under 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1681n and 1681o, respectively.      
 
 On April 22, 2009, Southwest filed a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, arguing that Fuges had failed to 
take certain actions required under FCRA (such as contacting 
Southwest and asking for a copy of her property report) and 
also arguing that Fuges could not prove that the report caused 
PNC to deny her credit application.  On July 15, 2009, the 
District Court dismissed most of Fuges‟s claims because she 
had failed to take actions required by FCRA, but the Court 
granted Fuges leave to amend her complaint.  She then filed 
an amended complaint, and Southwest again filed a motion to 
dismiss, which the District Court denied.   
 
 On August 1, 2011, Southwest moved for summary 
judgment.  It argued that its reports are not subject to FCRA, 
and that, even if they were, it was not liable because it did not 
willfully violate FCRA under the standard articulated in 
Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69-70.
4
  Southwest also asserted that it 
                                                                                                     
the bank had provided the credit insurance when she read her 
banking statement several months after she submitted her 
credit application, and PNC never notified her of its decision.  
PNC did not approve the increase in the line of credit.   
4
 In Safeco, the Supreme Court held that “a company 
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could not be held liable for any negligent violation of FCRA 
because PNC ultimately gave Fuges the credit insurance for 
which she had applied, and she did not suffer any injury as a 
result of Southwest‟s conduct.5   
 
 On November 21, 2011, the District Court issued an 
opinion and order granting the motion for summary judgment.  
The Court did not address whether Southwest‟s conduct fell 
within the scope of FCRA, or whether there was evidence of 
FCRA violations.  Rather, it determined that no reasonable 
jury could find that Southwest had acted willfully because 
Southwest‟s reading of FCRA as not being applicable to its 
                                                                                                     
subject to FCRA does not act in reckless disregard of it unless 
the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading 
of the statute‟s terms, but shows that the company ran a risk 
of violating the law substantially greater than the risk 
associated with a reading that was merely careless.”  551 U.S. 
at 69.   See infra Part II.B. 
5
 Fuges testified that, initially, all she wanted from 
PNC was the credit insurance, but that “since [she] was 
reapplying, [she] just asked for the increase” in the credit line. 
(App. at 428.)  According to the statement of undisputed facts 
that Southwest submitted in support of its motion for 
summary judgment, because “[s]he obtained this insurance 
even though her [credit] application was denied[,] ... [s]he 
explicitly testified that she suffered no damage other than the 
allegedly inaccurate information reported to PNC.” (App. at 
257.)  In her brief in opposition to Southwest‟s motion for 
summary judgment, Fuges elected to pursue only her claim 
for willful violations and not to press her claim for negligent 
violations of FCRA.   
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business was not unreasonable.  In particular, the Court said, 
“a reasonable jury could not conclude that Southwest 
willfully, i.e., knowingly or recklessly, violated ... FCRA, 
because Southwest reasonably interpreted its activities to fall 
outside the scope of the Act, in light of the less-than-clear 
statutory text and absence of meaningful judicial or FTC 
guidance.” 6  (App. at 13.)  In reaching that conclusion, the 
District Court reasoned that Southwest‟s interpretation of 
FCRA was “objectively reasonable” because the Fuges 
property report contained four sections – deeds, mortgages, 
parcel number and taxes, and lien information – that “more 
closely relate to a particular parcel of property than to a 
particular consumer.”  (App. at 10.)  The Court also 
considered it significant that Southwest‟s report did not 
contain “Fuges‟[s] social security number, payment history 
on various debts, or previous addresses, all of which one 
might expect to see on a typical credit report from a CRA.” 7  
                                              
6
 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has 
enforcement responsibility for certain FCRA provisions.  See 
Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70. 
7
 The District Court, like other courts, appears to have 
equated the term “consumer report,” which is defined in 
FCRA, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1), with a “credit report,” a 
term that is commonly understood to refer to a report like 
those prepared by one of the nationally recognized CRAs.  
See also Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 707 n.23 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“We use „consumer report‟ and „credit report‟ 
interchangeably.  The report referred to as a „consumer 
report‟ in the statute is more commonly known as a „credit 
report.‟”).  We note, however, that the two are not necessarily 
the same, as demonstrated by the fact that a report may 
constitute a “consumer report” when its purpose is not the 
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(Id.)  Thus, it determined that “Southwest‟s reading of 
FCRA‟s CRA definition, i.e., that Southwest‟s reports are „on 
properties‟ not „on consumers,‟ and therefore Southwest is 
not a CRA, has a foundation in the statutory text, which 
suggests that Southwest acted reasonably, not recklessly, with 
respect to FCRA.”  (Id.) 
 
 Fuges filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
                                                                                                     
securing of credit or other financial services.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681a(d)(1)(B), (C) (providing that purpose may be 
eligibility for employment or other purposes set forth in 
§ 1681b).   Information other than credit data may also render 
a report a “consumer report” covered by FCRA.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (providing that “any information ... 
bearing on a consumer‟s credit worthiness, credit standing, 
credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, or mode of living” constitutes a consumer 
report (emphasis added)). 
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II. Discussion
8
 
 
 A. FCRA 
 
FCRA “require[s] that consumer reporting agencies 
adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of 
commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and 
other information ... with regard to the confidentiality, 
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such 
information.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).9  The statute imposes 
                                              
8
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1681p.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review over 
the [D]istrict [C]ourt‟s grant of summary judgment, applying 
the same standard ... .”  Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 
F.3d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 2010).  “[S]ummary judgment is 
proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving person is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A factual 
dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable 
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).   
9
 The “reasonable procedures” required by FCRA 
include maintaining a system to provide fraud alerts to the 
consumer (15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1); maintaining an internal 
compliance system to ensure the accuracy of consumer 
information (id. § 1681e); providing disclosure of all 
information in a consumer‟s file on demand by the consumer 
(id. §§ 1681g, 1681h); and maintaining procedures to allow a 
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civil liability on “[a]ny person who ... fails to comply with 
any requirement imposed” by the statute.  See id. §§ 1681n, 
1681o.  A person who negligently fails to comply is liable to 
the affected consumer for actual damages.  Id. § 1681o(a)(1).  
A person who willfully fails to comply is liable to the affected 
consumer for actual damages, or statutory damages ranging 
from $100 to $1,000, as well as punitive damages and 
attorney‟s fees.  Id. § 1681n(a).    
 
 The enactment of FCRA “was prompted by 
congressional concern over abuses in the credit reporting 
industry.”  Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 962 
(3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Congress 
wanted “to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote 
efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer 
privacy.”  Safeco, 551 U.S. at 52.  In support of FCRA, 
Congress found that  
 
[a]n elaborate mechanism [had] been developed 
for investigating and evaluating the credit 
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, 
character, and general reputation of 
consumers[;] [] [that] [c]onsumer reporting 
agencies [had] assumed a vital role in 
assembling and evaluating consumer credit and 
other information on consumers; [and that] [] 
[t]here [was] a need to insure that consumer 
reporting agencies exercise their grave 
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a 
respect for the consumer's right to privacy. 
                                                                                                     
consumer to dispute and to correct inaccurate information (id. 
§ 1681i).      
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15 U.S.C. §1681(a).    
 
 FCRA only applies to CRAs.  The statute defines a 
“consumer reporting agency” as “any person which, for 
monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, 
regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of 
assembling or evaluating consumer
[10]
 credit information or 
other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing 
consumer reports to third parties … .”  Id. § 1681a(f). 
 
 Moreover, for a report to be covered by FCRA, it must 
be a “consumer report,” defined as   
 
any written, oral, or other communication of 
any information by a consumer reporting 
agency bearing on a consumer‟s credit 
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, 
character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, or mode of living which is used 
or expected to be used or collected in whole or 
in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in 
establishing the consumer‟s eligibility for –  
 
(A) credit or insurance to be used 
primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes;  
(B) employment purposes; or  
(C) any other purpose authorized under 
section 1681b of this title.  
                                              
10
 FCRA defines “consumer” as “an individual.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1681a(c). 
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Id. § 1681a(d)(1).
11
     
 
 Taken together, these definitions establish statutory 
markers against which the reasonableness of any reading of 
the applicability of FCRA must be measured.  One marker is 
that, for the preparer of a report to qualify as a CRA, the 
preparer must regularly engage in gathering information “on 
consumers” with the purpose of preparing and furnishing 
“consumer reports.”  Another marker is that, for a report to be 
subject to FCRA, it must both be a “consumer report” and 
have been prepared by a “consumer reporting agency,” as 
those terms are defined in the statute.   
 
                                              
11
 The defined term “consumer report” is subject to a 
number of statutory exclusions.  These include:  reports 
containing information relating solely to transactions or 
experiences between the consumer and the person making the 
report or communications between commonly-controlled or 
affiliated parties, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A); notifications of 
the extension of credit by credit card companies, id. 
§ 1681a(d)(2)(B); and reports containing the decision of a 
person who has been requested by a third party to extend 
credit to a consumer, provided that the consumer is informed 
of the request for the report, id. §1681a(d)(2)(C).  
Communications relating to prospective employment, 
including investigative reports, are also excluded.  Id. 
§ 1681a(d)(2)(D), 1681a(o), 1681a(y).  FCRA does not 
specifically except “property reports” or any similar reports 
from the definition of “consumer reports,” and we neither 
express nor imply any opinion on whether property reports of 
the kind at issue here are covered by FCRA.  
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 B. Liability Standard Under Safeco 
 
 The Supreme Court‟s landmark decision in Safeco 
Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007), set the 
framework that the District Court here relied on in granting 
summary judgment to Southwest.  Safeco involved insurance 
companies that relied in part on credit scores to set auto 
insurance premiums.  Because of unfavorable credit scores, 
some new applicants were quoted insurance rates that were 
higher than the best rates available.  The applicants argued 
that they had been subjected to an “increase” in rates (even 
though they had not previously enjoyed the lower rates) and 
so had suffered “adverse action” based on their credit reports, 
which required notice under § 1681m(a) of FCRA.  Id. at 54-
55.  The insurance companies argued that they did not have to 
comply with FCRA‟s notice requirement because the failure 
to offer the preferred rates to new customers could not 
constitute an “increase” in rates in the absence of prior 
dealing.  See id. at 69.  The plaintiffs sought statutory and 
punitive damages, which required that they prove that the 
failure to give notice was “willful.”  The Supreme Court held 
that it was not.  Although the Court disagreed with the 
insurance companies‟ interpretation of “increase,” it 
concluded that the interpretation was “not objectively 
unreasonable, and so falls well short of raising the 
„unjustifiably high risk‟ of violating the statute necessary for 
reckless liability.”  Id. at 70 (emphasis added).  The Court 
thus established a safe harbor against liability for willfulness.  
A company cannot be said to have willfully violated FCRA if 
the company acted on a reasonable interpretation of FCRA‟s 
coverage. 
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  The Court derived this “reasonable interpretation” test 
by deconstructing the word “willfully.”  FCRA imposes civil 
liability where the defendant “willfully fails to comply” with 
the statute.  15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
12
  The Court noted, 
however, that “„willfully‟ is a word of many meanings” and 
that “where willfulness is a statutory condition of civil 
liability, we have generally taken it to cover not only knowing 
violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well.”  Safeco, 
551 U.S. at 57 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Drawing on the “essence of recklessness at 
common law,” the Court said that “a company subject to 
FCRA does not act in reckless disregard of it unless the action 
is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the 
statute‟s terms, but shows that the company ran a risk of 
violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated 
with a reading that was merely careless.”  Safeco, 551 U.S. at 
69 (internal quotation marks omitted).  A defendant‟s conduct 
is reckless only if it was “objectively unreasonable” in light 
of “legal rules that were „clearly established‟ at the time.”  Id. 
at 69-70 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).  
Thus, even when a court disagrees with a party‟s reading of 
FCRA, it may not impose liability for a reckless, and 
therefore willful, violation of the statute unless that party‟s 
reading is “objectively unreasonable.” See id. at 69 (noting 
that the Court did not agree with Safeco‟s analysis and that its 
reading of FCRA was “erroneous”).13  
                                              
12
 FCRA also imposes liability for negligent violations.  
15 U.S.C. § 1681o.  However, Fuges elected to pursue only 
her claim for willful violations and not to press her 
negligence claim.    
13
 Although the analysis that yielded the Safeco 
“reasonable interpretation” test followed from the common 
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 In short, the Safeco test is one of “objective 
reasonableness,” and the Court explicitly rejected the 
argument that subjective bad faith must be taken into account 
in determining whether a defendant has acted recklessly, and 
therefore willfully, under FCRA.  In deciding that subjective 
bad faith is irrelevant, the Court said that, “[w]here … the 
statutory text and relevant court and agency guidance allow 
for more than one reasonable interpretation, it would defy 
history and current thinking to treat a defendant who merely 
adopts one such interpretation as a knowing or reckless 
violator.”  Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70 n.20. 
 
Fuges argues in this appeal that Southwest is not 
entitled to the Safeco “reasonable interpretation” defense, 
both because Southwest had not actually interpreted FCRA 
                                                                                                     
law definition of recklessness, knowing noncompliance also, 
of course, constitutes a willful FCRA violation.  See Safeco, 
551 U.S. at 57; see also Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 
F.3d 220, 227 (3d Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that an 
investigative policy could constitute a willful FCRA violation 
if adopted either “knowing that policy to be in contravention 
of the rights possessed by consumers pursuant to ...  FCRA or 
in reckless disregard of whether the policy contravened those 
rights”).  Fuges suggests that this may represent an alternative 
basis on which we may find willful violations on the part of 
Southwest. (See Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 26 (noting that 
“recklessness is not the only way for a plaintiff to prove an 
[sic] FCRA violation was willful” and that “knowing 
noncompliance may also constitute a willful FCRA 
violation”).)  However, the record contains no evidence that 
Southwest knew that it was in violation of FCRA, and Fuges 
did not make that argument in the District Court. 
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before concluding the statute did not apply to its activities
 
and 
because Southwest‟s interpretation of FCRA was not 
objectively reasonable.
14
  We take each of those arguments in 
turn. 
 
C.   Safeco’s Applicability Absent a “Reading” of 
 FCRA 
 
 Fuges contends that the District Court erred by 
extending the “reasonable reading” defense articulated in 
Safeco to Southwest‟s conduct even though Southwest failed 
                                              
14
 Fuges also argues that the District Court erred at the 
summary judgment stage by failing to consider evidence that 
Southwest‟s activities come within the ambit of FCRA, and 
that the District Court was required to consider evidence of 
willful violations prior to concluding that Southwest was, 
under Safeco, free from liability for such violations.  We 
disagree.  Evidence of knowing violations of FCRA is 
relevant to a claim of willfulness, see supra note 13, but then 
Safeco‟s recklessness analysis would not apply.  See Safeco, 
551 U.S. at 56-57 (noting that knowing violations of FCRA 
are willful by definition.)  When a plaintiff does not allege 
knowing violations of FCRA, however, the claim must be 
based on recklessness and Safeco‟s “reasonable 
interpretation” test applies.  In those “recklessness” cases, 
whether a defendant has actually violated FCRA is simply not 
the issue.  See id. at 68 (noting that, even “if Safeco did 
violate the statute, the company was not reckless in falling 
down in its duty”); id. at 69 (noting that “Safeco‟s reading of 
the statute, albeit erroneous, was not objectively 
unreasonable”); id. at 70 (“Safeco‟s misreading of the statute 
was not reckless.”). 
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to read or interpret FCRA in the first instance.  The District 
Court focused its analysis on the interpretation of the terms 
“consumer reporting agency” and “consumer report.”  (See 
App. at 9 (discussing components of the CRA definition in 15 
U.S.C. § 1681a(f)).)  The Court did not specifically address 
the question of whether Southwest had adopted a particular 
interpretation of those terms prior to preparing the Fuges 
property report or prior to the commencement of this lawsuit. 
 
 The timing, however, is not dispositive.  In Long v. 
Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., 671 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2012), we 
expressly rejected the argument that a defendant is required to 
have a pre-litigation “reading” of FCRA to avail itself of the 
Safeco “reasonable interpretation” defense.  671 F.3d at 377.  
Long involved the interpretation of the phrase “expiration 
date” in a FCRA provision governing the disclosure of credit 
card information.  Like Fuges, the plaintiff in Long argued 
that the defendant “did not actually rely on any interpretation 
of [FCRA] and instead disregarded the statute altogether and 
is only now seizing upon a post hoc „objectively reasonable‟ 
interpretation in order to shield itself from liability.”  Id. 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  That 
argument struck us as being, in essence, an assertion about 
the defendant‟s intent or subjective bad faith, and, as such, it 
was “expressly foreclosed by Safeco,” because such evidence 
“is irrelevant when there is an objectively reasonable 
interpretation of the statute that would allow the conduct in 
question.”  Id. (citing Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70 n.20).   
 
 Fuges argues that Long and other cases in which 
defendants were found to have relied on a reasonable 
interpretation of FCRA may be distinguished from two post-
Safeco cases in which there was “no evidence whatsoever of a 
 19 
 
[FCRA] „reading‟ by the defendant,” and in which the Safeco 
defense did not apply.  (See Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 40 
(citing Birmingham v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 633 F.3d 
1006 (10th Cir. 2011); Saunders v. Branch Banking & Trust 
Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142 (4th Cir. 2008)).)  However, in 
neither of those cases was the interpretation of specific FCRA 
terms at issue.
15
   
 
 Fuges also notes that in most of the post-Safeco cases, 
such as Long, Shlatichman v. 1-800-Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 
794 (7th Cir. 2010), and Levine v. World Financial Network 
National Bank, 554 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2009), the 
“defendants acknowledged ... FCRA‟s regulatory existence, 
and attempted to comply with it on some level.” (Appellant‟s 
Opening Br. at 40.)  However, in each of those cases, the 
defendant also acknowledged that it was subject to FCRA, 
and the only disputed issue was the interpretation or 
                                              
15
 The dispute in Birmingham was whether a CRA had 
willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) by failing to follow 
reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of its consumer 
reports, and whether it had violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) 
because it did not adequately address a consumer‟s concerns 
about the accuracy of his credit file.  See Birmingham, 633 
F.3d at 1009.  However, the defendant‟s reading of the 
relevant FCRA provisions was not at issue.  The Saunders 
court did not apply the Safeco “reasonable interpretation” test 
because a jury had already found willful FCRA violations 
based on a pre-Safeco instruction that the defendant had to 
have acted “knowingly and intentionally.”  See Saunders, 526 
F.3d at 151 & n.4 (noting that the jury instruction had placed 
a greater burden on the plaintiff than the Safeco test, and that 
he had met that burden). 
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applicability of a particular provision of FCRA.  In the 
present case, based on its interpretation of the definitions of 
“consumer report” and “consumer reporting agency,” 
Southwest has urged that it is not subject to FCRA at all. 
 
 In summary, Southwest does not lose the potential 
protection of the “reasonable interpretation” defense, even if 
it never actually interpreted FCRA prior to the 
commencement of this lawsuit.  Safeco requires only that “the 
company‟s reading of the statute is objectively reasonable,” 
Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70 n.20 (emphasis added), and that the 
interpretation that would allow the conduct in question is “an 
interpretation that could reasonably have found support in the 
courts,” id.  Safeco does not require that the defendant 
actually have made such an interpretation at any particular 
point in time.   
 
D.   Southwest’s Liability Under the Safeco Test 
 
 Fuges argues in the alternative that, even if Southwest 
is potentially entitled to shelter in Safeco‟s safe harbor, the 
District Court erred in holding that no reasonable jury could 
find that Southwest had acted recklessly, and therefore 
willfully, in treating FCRA as inapplicable.
16
  Fuges contends 
                                              
16
 At the outset of her treatment of this issue, Fuges 
suggests that “no court has ever found that it is jury question 
whether a defendant had an objectively reasonable reading of 
FCRA statutory text” because “[j]uries focus on facts, not 
[on] the interpretation of statutory text, particularly 
ambiguous statutory text.”  (Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 50.)  
However, Fuges misapprehends the District Court in this 
regard.  The District Court held only that a reasonable jury 
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that neither Southwest nor the District Court specifically 
identified any ambiguity in the statutory text,
17
 and that any 
reading of FCRA as being inapplicable must be reckless.   
                                                                                                     
could not find that Southwest had acted recklessly, and 
therefore willfully, based on the Court‟s own determination 
that the FCRA definitions of “consumer reporting agency” 
and “consumer report” were ambiguous, and that Southwest‟s 
interpretation was not objectively unreasonable.  (See App. at 
13 (emphasizing the “narrow scope of [the Court‟s] 
decision”).)  After Safeco, a jury may be called on to 
determine whether violations of FCRA were willful or 
negligent, based on the facts surrounding defendants‟ 
adoption of a particular reading of the statute.  See Cortez, 
617 F.3d at 722 (considering the “jury‟s reasoned 
determination” that the defendant was “not merely careless” 
in determining that FCRA did not apply); see also id. (noting 
that “the verdict of this lay jury reveals an understanding of 
the distinction between negligent and willful”); id. at 723 
(speculating that “[t]he jury may well have concluded” that 
the defendant deliberately risked violating FCRA because the 
offending consumer information “was a separate product that 
could be sold to customers at an additional cost”). 
 
17
 Fuges‟s argument misses the mark.  She takes pains 
to demonstrate that the text of the specific FCRA provisions 
for which she alleges violations (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(a), (b), 
(c), (d), 1681h(c)) is unambiguous, and that courts of appeals 
(including this Court) have already construed those 
provisions.  However, it was only the definitions of 
“consumer report” and “consumer reporting agency” in 15 
U.S.C. § 1681a(d), (f) that the District Court concluded were 
unclear.  (See App. at 12-13 (noting that these definitions add 
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 To understand why Fuges is mistaken, it is helpful to 
consider why the “reasonable interpretation” test was met in 
Safeco.  We noted in Long that there were three bases for the 
Supreme Court‟s decision in Safeco.  First, FCRA gave no 
clear guidance on whether the auto insurers were required to 
view an initial rate offer as an “increase” in rates that would 
constitute adverse action and trigger a consumer notification 
requirement.  Long, 671 F.3d at 376 (citing Safeco, 551 U.S. 
at 69-70).
18
  Second, the insurers‟ proposed interpretation that 
their quotes were not an adverse action “had a „foundation  in 
the statutory text ... and a sufficiently convincing justification 
to have persuaded the District Court to adopt it.‟”  Id. 
(quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69-70) (omission in original).  
And third, the insurers were interpreting the statute in the 
absence of any contrary authority on the meaning of 
“increase” because “„no court of appeals had spoken on the 
issue, and no authoritative guidance has yet come from the 
FTC.‟”  Id. (quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70).   
 
 The District Court here was satisfied that conditions 
similar to those that had rendered Safeco‟s  reading of FCRA 
“not objectively unreasonable” were present in this case.  
First, the Court decided that the statutory definitions of 
“consumer reporting agency” and “consumer report” were 
ambiguous as applied to “a company like Southwest that sells 
so-called „current owner reports.‟”  (App. at 10.)   Second, the 
Court determined that Southwest‟s reading of FCRA‟s CRA 
                                                                                                     
“an additional layer of interpretive complexity,” as applied to 
Southwest, not found in other FCRA cases).) 
18
 The Safeco Court characterized the statutory text as 
“less-than-pellucid.”  Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70. 
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definition as not covering Southwest “has a foundation in the 
statutory text.”19  (Id.)  Third, the Court found “an absolute 
dearth of judicial or agency guidance regarding whether ... 
FCRA” covers the activities of Southwest. (Id. at 11.)  The 
District Court thus concluded that Southwest did not act 
recklessly with respect to FCRA.   
 
 We agree with the District Court‟s analysis.  First,  the 
FCRA definitions of “consumer reporting agency” and 
“consumer report” are ambiguous as they relate to Southwest.  
The source of this ambiguity is the phrase “information on 
consumers” in the CRA definition, and the phrase “bearing on 
a consumer[ ]” in the definition of consumer report.  Fuges 
argues, in essence, that any information in the Southwest 
property report that relates to her is information “on” or 
“bearing on” her as a consumer.  But to take this argument to 
its limits, virtually any information gathered in connection 
with a consumer lending transaction can be characterized as 
information on, or bearing on, the individual applicant 
because it says something related to the applicant.  Thus, the 
unbounded nature of these definitions renders them 
ambiguous when one tries to figure out just how broadly a 
sensible definition should reach.  
 
                                              
19
 The District Court focused on the requirement that 
an entity “assemble or evaluate „consumer credit information 
or other information on consumers‟” to be covered by the 
FCRA definition of “consumer reporting agency.” (App. at 9 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f)).)  The Court concluded that 
Southwest‟s reading of that language to exclude it from 
coverage as a CRA, “because it reports on properties, not 
consumers,” id., was not objectively unreasonable. 
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 Second, Southwest‟s reading of the applicable 
provisions of FCRA has some foundation in the statutory text, 
and was therefore not objectively unreasonable.  The 
definition of a CRA requires that a company “engage[ ] in 
whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating 
consumer credit information or other information on 
consumers.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).  Southwest could 
reasonably interpret that provision to exclude information that 
it assembles with regard to a subject property, because such 
information is not “on consumers.”  Likewise, the definition 
of “consumer report” encompasses only reports that contain 
“information [assembled] by a [CRA] bearing on a 
consumer‟s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, 
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or 
mode of living.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).  Southwest could 
reasonably interpret that provision to exclude its property 
reports, both because it interpreted the CRA definition to 
exclude itself,
20
 and because the information on property 
                                              
20
 This case differs from other post-Safeco cases where 
the defendants claimed the Safeco defense for alleged willful 
violations of FCRA.  In those cases, the defendant was 
indisputably a CRA, and  the issue was whether the 
challenged conduct constituted a willful violation of a 
particular FCRA provision because the defendant had 
unreasonably interpreted that provision.  See, e.g., 
Birmingham, 633 F.3d at 1009 (considering whether a CRA 
had “reasonable procedures” to assure accuracy as required 
by 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)); Levine, 554 F.3d at 1318-19 
(considering whether a CRA had complied with requirement 
for sale of consumer report for “account review” pursuant to 
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3));  Shannon v. Equifax Info. Servs., 
LLC, 764 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (considering 
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encumbrances does not necessarily “bear on” any of the 
characteristics of an individual consumer‟s personal 
creditworthiness listed in that provision. 
 
 Third, there is no judicial or agency guidance that 
would suggest that Southwest‟s reading of FCRA is contrary 
to the intended meaning of the provisions in question.
21
   
Under Safeco, the inquiry is whether “the company ran a risk 
of violating the law substantially greater than the risk 
associated with a reading that was merely careless.”  551 U.S. 
at 69; see also Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 
723 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding recklessness where defendant 
“substantially risked acting in violation of [FCRA]”).  The 
District Court correctly determined that Southwest was not 
                                                                                                     
whether a CRA had “reasonable procedures” and conducted 
an investigation of allegedly inaccurate information as 
required by 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681i(a), respectively).  
In this case, as the District Court noted, “Southwest disputed 
not only that its current owner reports fall within ... FCRA‟s 
definition of „consumer reports,‟ but also that it even qualifies 
as a „consumer reporting agency‟ in the first place.”  (App. at 
A12 (noting that “[t]his adds an additional layer of 
interpretive complexity”).)  
21
 While the absence of contrary authority to a 
particular FCRA interpretation is persuasive as to the 
reasonableness of the adoption of that interpretation, it is not 
dispositive.  “It merely establishes that the issue has not been 
presented to a court of appeals before.  The credit agency 
whose conduct is first examined under that section of the 
[FCRA] should not receive a pass because the issue has never 
been decided.”  Cortez, 617 F.3d at 722. 
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reckless because Southwest did not run a “substantial risk” in 
adopting its interpretation of FCRA, in the absence of 
authority contrary to that interpretation.  As the District Court 
noted, there does not appear to be any judicial or agency 
guidance as to whether FCRA covers companies like 
Southwest.  Cases concerning the CRA status of companies 
that are not credit bureaus but that still assemble “information 
on consumers” have typically addressed employee 
background investigatory reports that have little in common 
with the property reports at issue here.  See, e.g., Poore v. 
Sterling Testing Sys., 410 F. Supp. 2d 557 (E.D. Ky. 2006) 
(holding that a company that reports on criminal records of 
job applicants is a CRA);  Lewis v. Ohio Prof’l Elec. 
Network, LLC, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (S.D. Ohio 2002) 
(same).   Moreover, those companies qualify as CRAs under 
part of the FCRA “consumer report” definition that 
specifically addresses employment eligibility reports.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(B).   Unlike Southwest, companies that 
assemble such reports indisputably assemble “information on 
consumers,” namely the employment candidates who are the 
subject of the reports.
22
   
                                              
22
 FTC guidance on FCRA coverage is similarly scant.  
FTC guidance letters, like the judicial opinions noted above, 
are largely limited to employment eligibility reports.  See, 
e.g., FTC Staff Opinion 9-15-99 (addressing CRA status of 
law firm that researches criminal records of job applicants for 
its clients);  FTC Staff Opinion 9-9-98 (addressing CRA 
status of company that provides information on prospective 
employees to fast food companies).  See also Letter from  
Federal Trade Commission to Richard LeBlanc, Due 
Diligence, Inc. (June 9, 1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/ statutes/fcra/ leblanc.shtm (confirming 
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 The District Court‟s ably stated conclusion that 
Southwest cannot be held liable for willful violations of 
FCRA is consistent with our holding in Long and finds 
support in numerous other cases in which courts have applied 
Safeco and declined to hold defendants liable absent evidence 
of a reckless approach to FCRA compliance.  See, e.g., Long, 
671 F.3d at 377-78 (finding no liability for willful FCRA 
violations despite the fact that the court rejected the 
defendant‟s interpretation of the statute); Birmingham, 633 
F.3d at 1009 (finding no liability “because of the absence of 
evidence of intentional or reckless misconduct”); Levine, 554 
F.3d at 1318-19 (finding no liability where defendant 
reasonably interpreted “account” as including a “closed 
account”). 23     
                                                                                                     
that company that performs background checks and 
assembles and sells reports containing the information is a 
CRA).  Even if there were FTC staff letters that address the 
applicability of FCRA to companies like Southwest, “the 
Supreme Court has expressly declined to describe such letters 
as „authoritative guidance.‟”  Levine, 554 F.3d at 1319 (citing 
Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70 n.19).   
23
 Fuges principally relies on Cortez, supra, in support 
of her argument that Southwest acted recklessly in adopting 
its interpretation of FCRA.  Cortez is, however, readily 
distinguishable from the present case in that the defendant‟s 
interpretation there was in direct opposition to published 
authority on the applicability of FCRA.  In Cortez, the 
offending information was an erroneous notation in a 
consumer report that the plaintiff was on a Treasury 
Department list of terrorists and drug traffickers ineligible for 
credit.  See Cortez, 617 F.3d at 704-05.  The defendant 
claimed that the information did not “bear on” the consumer‟s 
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 In summary, Southwest‟s interpretation of the FCRA 
definitions of “consumer reporting agency” and “consumer 
report” is not unreasonable, and Southwest “did not run „a 
risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk 
associated with a reading that was merely careless.‟”  Long, 
671 F.3d at 378 (quoting Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69).  Fuges 
therefore has not stated a claim for a willful violation of 
FCRA.
24
   
                                                                                                     
creditworthiness, and that it was therefore not subject to 
FCRA.  However, Treasury Department regulations explicitly 
stated that information regarding a consumer‟s inclusion on 
the terrorist watch list was governed by FCRA when included 
in a consumer report.  Id. at 722.  Moreover, a Treasury 
Department website notified consumers that both FCRA and 
FTC regulations provided them with a remedy against a CRA 
that furnished incorrect information about their presence on 
the watch list.  Id.  Given this explicit contrary guidance, we 
concluded that the defendant “substantially risked acting in 
violation of the law,” as it adopted an interpretation of FCRA 
that was objectively unreasonable.  Id. at 723; see also id. at 
721  (“[T]he fact that [a defendant‟s] actions rest upon a legal 
conclusion does not immunize it from liability for reckless 
conduct under ... FCRA.”)  In the absence of the sort of 
contrary guidance present in Cortez, we cannot say that 
Southwest was similarly reckless in believing that its 
activities are not covered by FCRA.   
24
 Like the District Court, we “need not, and do not, 
decide whether Southwest‟s business model, including its ... 
report on Fuges, falls within ... FCRA‟s sphere.”  (App. at 
13.)  Because we have concluded that Southwest did not 
willfully violate FCRA, and because Fuges chose not to 
pursue her claim for negligent violations of the statute, see 
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III. Conclusion 
 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
 
                                                                                                     
supra note 5, there is no sound reason to answer in this case 
whether Southwest negligently violated FCRA. 
